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C. S. LEWIS'S CRITIQUE OF
HUME'S "OF MIRACLES"
Robert A. Larmer

In this article I argue that C. S. Lewis is both a perceptive reader and trenchant
critic of David Hume's views on miracle.

Despite his popularity as a Christian apologist and despite the fact that one
of his major works is Miracles: A Preliminary Study, C. S. Lewis is virtually
ignored in contemporary discussions of miracles. When he is mentioned,
he is usually quickly dismissed as displaying a superficial understanding
of David Hume's famous criticism of the possibility of rational belief in
miracles based on testimonial evidence.
My contention in this article is that such dismissals are unjustified. Al
though he did not write as a professional philosopher and did not direct
his writing to specialists in philosophy, Lewis was well trained in philoso
phy. While a student at University College, Oxford, he received a First in
Greats (Philosophy and Ancient History) and, as a young man, served
as philosophy tutor at University College. While at Oxford, Lewis served
as the first president of the famous Socratic Club founded by Stella Aldwinckle in 1941 as an "open forum for the discussion of the intellectual
difficulties connected with religion and with Christianity in particular."1
Regarding the Socratic Club, Antony Flew has commented that "the five
or ten years immediately following the end of World War II were the hey
day of what the media dubbed 'Oxford linguistic philosophy' . . . [and] it
was mainly in meetings of the Socratic Club that Oxford linguistic philos
ophers . . . began to explore what Immanuel Kant famously distinguished
as the three great questions of philosophy—God, Freedom and Immor
tality."2 Lewis regularly read papers at the Scoratic Club and engaged in
dialogue with Elizabeth Anscombe, A. J. Ayer, Antony Flew and Gilbert
Ryle, to name only a few of the philosophers that contributed papers. The
fact that philosophers of this stature took Lewis seriously suggests that
his critique of Hume's "Of Miracles" deserves more attention by profes
sional philosophers than it typically receives. Once this attention is paid
it becomes clear that, although he did not devote a great deal of space to
discussion of Hume's argument, Lewis is both a perceptive reader and
trenchant critic of Hume's views on miracle.
Three major criticisms of Hume's position emerge in Miracles. The
first two occur in Chapter XIII, "On Probability," and are explicitly de
veloped in response to Hume. The third occurs in Chapter VIII, "Miracle
and the Laws of Nature," and is not explicitly developed in response to
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Hume, although it seems to contain Lewis's most important objection to
Hume's argument.
Lewis's explicit criticisms of Hume focus on the argument of Part I of
the "Essay on Miracles." He raises the issues of: (1) whether Hume's ac
count of natural law found in "Of Miracles" is consistent with what he says
elsewhere concerning causality and induction, and (2) whether Hume's
argument against the rationality of belief in miracles is viciously circular.
It is interesting that, although these two criticisms can be distinguished,
they are curiously intertwined in Lewis's exposition. I think the reason
this is so is that Lewis is concerned not only to expose flaws in Hume's ar
gument, but to provide positive philosophical grounds for taking reports
of miracles seriously.
Lewis's interpretation of the argument of Part I of the "Essay" is the tra
ditional one that it is intended to demonstrate that belief in a miracle can
never, even in principle, be rationally justified on the basis of testimonial
evidence.3 He summarizes the argument as follows:
Probability rests on what may be called the majority vote of our past
experiences. The more often a thing has been known to happen, the
more probable it is that it should happen again; and the less often the
less probable. . . . The regularity of Nature's course . . . is supported
by something better than the majority vote of past experiences: it is
supported by their unanimous vote, . . . by "firm and unalterable
experience." There is, . . . "uniform experience" against Miracle; oth
erwise, . . . it would not be a Miracle. A miracle is therefore the most
improbable of all events. It is always more probable that the wit
nesses were lying or mistaken than that a miracle occurred.4
In response to Hume, Lewis initially raises the issue of whether the
argument is circular, but then digresses to the question of how belief in
the uniformity of nature is justified, only to return after this digression
to the charge that Hume's argument is circular. It is in the context of
this digression that Lewis develops, very briefly, an ad hominem argu
ment that Hume's assumption of the uniformity of nature in the "Es
say" is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere regarding induction.
Lewis writes,
Unless Nature always goes on in the same way, the fact that a thing
had happened ten million times would not make it a whit more
probable that it would happen again. And how do we know the Uni
formity of Nature? A moment's thought shows that we do not know
it by experience. . . . Experience . . . cannot prove uniformity, because
uniformity has to be assumed before experience proves anything. . . .
Unless Nature is uniform, nothing is either probable or improbable.
And clearly the assumption which you have to make before there
is any such thing as probability cannot itself be probable. . . . The
odd thing is that no man knew this better than Hume. His Essay on
Miracles is quite inconsistent with the more radical, and honourable,
scepticism of his main work.5
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This criticism is hardly unique to Lewis. There is no way of knowing for
sure, but Lewis may well have been aware that C. D. Broad had made this
point at much greater length in an article published in the 1916-17 volume
of the Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society. Broad writes:
Hume has told us that he can find no logical ground for induction.
He cannot see why it should be justifiable to pass from a frequent
experience of A followed by B, to a belief that A always will be fol
lowed by B. All that he professes to do is to tell us that we actually
do make this transition, and to explain psychologically how it comes
about. Now, this being so, I cannot see how Hume can distinguish
between our variously caused beliefs about matters of fact, and call
some of them justifiable and others unjustifiable. . . . Hume's disbe
lief [in a miracle] is due to his natural tendency to pass from the con
stant experience of A followed by B to the belief that A will always be
followed by B. The enthusiast's belief is due to his natural tendency
to believe what is wonderful and makes for the credit of his religion.
But Hume has admitted that he sees no logical justification for beliefs
in matters of fact which are merely caused by a regular experience.
Hence the enthusiast's belief in miracles and Hume's belief in natu
ral laws (and consequent disbelief in miracles) stand on precisely
the same logical footing. In both cases we can see the psychologi
cal cause of the belief, but in neither can Hume give us any logical
ground for it.6
Fred Wilson suggests that Broad's and, by implication Lewis's, reading of
Hume on this point is superficial. In response to Broad and Lewis's claim
that Hume's treatment of miracles is not consistent with his views regard
ing induction, Wilson writes that "there is a certain implausibility to this
claim that makes it a difficult one to entertain seriously, since it is unlikely
that a philosopher as careful as Hume would have failed to recognize the
inconsistency if it existed."7 It may be agreed that it is unwise to be over
hasty in attributing inconsistency to a philosopher of Hume's stature, but
it is scarcely unknown that the greatest thinkers are occasionally guilty in
this regard, and there seems no reason to assume that Hume is incapable
of such slips. The real question is whether the text supports Wilson's inter
pretation, as opposed to Broad and Lewis's.
Wilson offers two arguments in support of his contention that Hume
is not guilty of inconsistency. The first is that neither the scepticism inher
ent in Hume's treatment of causality and induction nor the dogmatism
characteristic of his explicit statements in "Of Miracles" represents his
true view concerning the laws of nature. Wilson suggests that in order
to arrive at Hume's true view of the laws of nature, we must examine his
account of probable reasoning and its grounding in human psychology.
When we do this we find that the idea of necessary connection is retained
as an essential element of the concept of causality, but that this idea of
necessary connection is grounded in human psychology, not in nature itself.8 The justification of taking our admittedly psychologically grounded
concept of causality as involving necessary connections seriously is that
it offers a pragmatic justification of science and it is science alone that is
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capable of satisfying our curiosity and desire for truth.9 Belief in miracles
explains nothing and leaves our experience incomprehensible, whereas
belief in causality and the uniformity of nature allows us to understand
the world.
Wilson's second argument is that Hume's account of causal reasoning
is not simply that in our experience an event A is always followed by an
event B.10 Hume recognized that in our experience "'tis frequently found,
that one observation is contrary to another, and that causes and effects
follow not in the same order of which we have had experience, [in such
instances] we are oblig'd to vary our reasoning on account of this uncer
tainty, and take into consideration the contrariety of events."11Thus, "from
the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim,
that the connexion betwixt all causes and effects is equally necessary, and
that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret
opposition of contrary causes."12 Wilson concludes from remarks such as
this that "Hume's crucial move is to insist that simply because an event
is somehow incomprehensible to a spectator, it does not follow that one
can reasonably infer that it is a miracle, or even probably a miracle."13 He
goes on to chastise Broad, and by implication Lewis, for failing to recog
nize that "the fact that we discover exceptions to what we have previously
thought to be regularities hardly testifies to there being events that are
miracles, that is, events that violate laws of nature."14
With regard to Wilson's first argument, two critical comments seem in
order. First, Hume's most explicit remarks concerning the laws of nature
occur in "Of Miracles." It is exegetically suspect to ignore his explicit treat
ment of the laws of nature in the "Essay" in hopes of deriving a more
palatable alternative from a different portion of his philosophy. Further,
deriving a more palatable alternative would not absolve Hume of the
charge of inconsistency, since it would remain true that it is not the con
cept of unalterable natural law he is working with in "Of Miracles." The
issue is not whether Hume could have developed a concept of the laws of
nature consistent with his treatment of induction and causality or whether
such a concept can be found elsewhere in his work but whether the con
cept actually employed in "Of Miracles" is consistent with his treatment
of induction and causality earlier in the Enquiry.15
Second, the suggestion that belief in the uniformity of nature can be
pragmatically justified on the basis of the success of science16begs the ques
tion of whether Hume's treatment of induction is consistent with the view
of science being espoused by Wilson. Wilson seems to feel that any diffi
culty in this regard can be overcome if we realize that "the fact that we run
across an event that violates a regular pattern of our experience provides
evidence only that the pattern is not a law, but it does not falsify the belief
that there is a law that explains it, for the latter can be inferred on the basis
of our more general experience, which leads us to conclude that for any
event there is a law that explains it."17 What Wilson fails to see is that any
appeal to experience as justifying the conclusion that for every event there
is a law that explains it is inconsistent with Hume's account of induction.
We have already noted Lewis's comment that "experience . . . cannot prove
uniformity, because uniformity has to be assumed before experience proves
anything."18 Once one accepts Hume's denial of necessary connections and
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his reduction of causality to constant conjunction, it becomes impossible
to argue that the fact that certain events have been constantly conjoined in
the past provides any reason for thinking they will be constantly, or even
probably, conjoined in the future.19 As Hume comments, "it is impossible
. . . that any arguments from experience can prove . . . resemblance of the
past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition
of that resemblance .20 Wilson's appeal to the rules of eliminative induction
as grounding science presupposes that we can justify prediction of the fu
ture on the basis of past experience and involves a view of induction that
contradicts Hume's explicit treatment of this issue.21
Wilson's second argument "that Hume's crucial move is to insist that
simply because an event is somehow incomprehensible to a spectator, it
does not follow that one can reasonably infer that it is a miracle, or even
probably a miracle"22 and thus "the fact that we discover exceptions to
what we have previously thought to be regularities hardly testifies to
there being events that are miracles, that is, events that violate laws of
nature"23 also seems deficient. It is true that Hume wants to distinguish
between unusual events that can plausibly be viewed as having natural
though unknown causes, i.e., marvels, and those that cannot, i.e., miracles.
A criticism of his argument that appears to have concerned Hume is that
it is unreasonable to insist that one's uniform personal experience should
inevitably trump the testimony of others. The class of unusual events is
not exhausted by miracles and we quite often accept the occurrence of
unusual events outside our personal experience on the basis of testimo
nial evidence. On pain of his argument proving too much Hume must
argue not that it is in general impossible to establish the occurrence of
unusual events on the basis of testimonial evidence, but that it is impos
sible to establish the occurrence of a special type of unusual event, that
is, miracles, on the basis of such evidence. His concern to deal with this
criticism seems to be what motivated Hume, in the 1750 second edition, to
include a discussion of Locke's well-known example of the Indian prince.
He wants to claim that testimony can be sufficiently strong to establish the
occurrence of marvels, but not of miracles. He attempts to do this on the
ground that an event that is a marvel is unusual, but it does not contradict
our firm and unalterable experience, that is, the laws of nature, whereas
a miracle does contradict such experience, that is, it violates the laws of
nature.24 It is an error, therefore, to suggest, as does J. C. A. Gaskin, that
Hume can dispense with the distinction he attempts to draw between
marvels and miracles.25
Even the most superficial reading of "Of Miracles" makes clear, how
ever, that Hume was convinced that if certain events were to occur, they
would be genuinely miraculous. Thus, he is quite prepared to say that "it
is a miracle that a dead man should come to life."26 Wilson goes wrong in
confusing two logically distinct questions: "How much testimonial evi
dence is needed to establish the occurrence of an unusual event?" and "On
what basis could it be established that an unusual event is a miracle?" Wil
son takes Hume to be addressing the second question and interprets him
as arguing that it is impossible to justify belief that an unusual event is a
violation of the laws of nature. On Wilson's reading, Hume's argument is
directed not at the difficulties of establishing unusual events on the basis
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of testimonial evidence but at the impossibility of ever rationally believing
that an unusual event constitutes a violation of the laws of nature.27
Unfortunately, this reading makes nonsense not only of Hume's explicit
willingness to identify certain conceivable events as miracles but also of his
emphasis on the inability of testimonial evidence to establish such events.
If Wilson's reading is accepted, it becomes a mystery why Hume would
concern himself with issues of testimony, since the argument would estab
lish that no matter what the unusual event, it is always irrational to view
it as a violation of the laws of nature.28 Contra Wilson, Hume's aim is not
to argue that the Resurrection of Jesus could never be accurately described
as a miracle, but rather that testimonial evidence could never justify be
lief that it did in fact occur. What Broad and Lewis recognize but Wilson
fails to recognize-and what must be taken into account in any discussion
of whether Hume's treatment of miracles is consistent with his sceptical
treatment of induction and causality-is that Hume's argument is directed
not at demonstrating that it is irrational to believe that unusual events of
a certain conceivable type, that is to say miracles, violate the laws of na
ture, but at showing there could never be sufficient testimonial evidence
to justify belief in the occurrence of such events. Wilson does not succeed,
therefore, in demonstrating that there is no inconsistency between Hume's
treatment of induction earlier in the Enquiry and his claims regarding "un
alterable laws of nature" in "Of Miracles."
Unfortunately, establishing an inconsistency between Hume's account
of induction and his claims regarding unalterable laws of nature does little
to advance a positive case for believing in miracles. As Lewis notes, fol
lowing Hume,
we cannot say that uniformity is either probable or improbable; and
equally we cannot say that miracles are either probable or improb
able. We have impounded both uniformity and miracles in a sort
of limbo where probability and improbability can never come. This
result is equally disastrous for the scientist and the theologian; but
along Hume's lines there is nothing whatever to be done about it.29
Lewis, however, is not content to offer a purely negative argument. He
goes on to observe that we do in fact have a deep trust in the uniformity
of nature, that "in advance of experience, in the teeth of many experi
ences, we are already enlisted on the side of uniformity."30 It is this deep
trust that regularities in nature can always be discovered, even in the face
of apparent evidence to the contrary, that makes science possible. This
raises the question of whether such trust should be regarded as justified
or simply as an irrational quirk of human nature. Can trust in the unifor
mity of nature, which seems to be a prerequisite of science, be philosophi
cally vindicated?
Lewis writes that the answer to this question depends upon one's meta
physic. If one is a naturalist there seems no reason to view such trust as in
fact justified, but if one is a theist such trust seems eminently reasonable.
If all that exists is Nature, the great mindless interlocking event, if our
own deepest convictions are merely the bye-products of an irrational
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process, then clearly there is not the slightest ground for supposing
that our sense of fitness and our consequent faith in uniformity tell
us anything about a reality external to ourselves. . . . If Naturalism
is true we have no reason to trust our conviction that Nature is uni
form. It can be trusted only if quite a different Metaphysic is true. If
the deepest thing in reality, the Fact which is the source of all other
facthood, is a thing in some degree like ourselves—if it is a Rational
Spirit and we derive our rational spirituality from It—then indeed
our conviction can be trusted. Our repugnance to disorder is derived
from Nature's Creator and ours. The disorderly world which we can
not endure to believe in is the disorderly world He would not have
endured to create.31
Put a little differently, one of the central presuppositions of science seems
to require a theistic metaphysics, if we are to place any trust in it. Once one
adopts such a metaphysic, however, one must recognize the possibility of
miracles. As Lewis puts it,
the philosophy which forbids you to make uniformity absolute is
also the philosophy which offers you solid grounds for believing it
to be almost absolute. The Being who threatens Nature's claim to om
nipotence confirms her in her lawful occasions. . . . The alternative is
really much worse. Try to make Nature absolute and you find that
her uniformity is not even probable. By claiming too much, you get
nothing. You get the deadlock, as in Hume. Theology offers you a
working arrangement, which leaves the scientist free to continue his
experiments and the Christian to continue his prayers.32
Lewis's second explicit criticism is that Hume's argument is viciously
circular. Hume writes that "a firm and unalterable experience has estab
lished the laws of nature"33 and since "a miracle is a violation of the laws
of nature,"34 "there must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation."35
Lewis responds that this argument begs the question, inasmuch as it as
sumes what needs to be proved. He writes,
now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely
"uniform experience" against miracles, if in other words they have
never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know
the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all
the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be
false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In
fact, we are arguing in a circle.36
As in the case of his previous criticism of Hume's argument, this objection
is not unique to Lewis, but was made by earlier writers. One of Hume's
early critics, William Samuel Powell, asserts that Hume's claim that "na
ture . . . is uniform and unvaried in her operations . . . either presumes the
point in question, or touches not those events which are supposed to be
out of the course of nature"37 and William Paley, writing in the nineteenth
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century, makes essentially this point against Hume, when he claims that
for Hume "to state concerning the fact in question that no such thing was
ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to assume the
subject of the controversy.38
Lewis's charge that Hume's argument is viciously circular is frequently
dismissed as based on a superficial reading of Part I of the "Essay." Joseph
Houston suggests that Lewis takes Hume as claiming that a law of nature
is based on uniform invariable experience that can allow of no exceptions
if it is to be a law. Such an understanding of the laws of nature implies
that miracles cannot occur, since they would be exceptions to what are,
by definition, exceptionless regularities. Since Hume did not take himself
simply to be exploring the implications of his definition of the laws of
nature, Houston claims that Lewis must be mistaken in his understanding
of Hume's argument.39
Robert Fogelin also accuses Lewis of misreading Hume. He asserts that
Hume never argues that we know that all reports of miracles are false. He
takes Hume simply to be claiming that we have a good deal of reliable
testimonial evidence for the regularities of nature and that this body of
evidence creates a strong presumption that testimonial evidence that these
regularities have exceptions is false. He goes on to suggest that charges
of circularity are probably due to the mistake of "attributing an a priori
argument [against the possibility of a miracle occurring] to Hume where
there is none.40
With regard to Houston's criticism of Lewis, while it seems true that
Hume did not take himself simply to be exploring the implications of a
definition of the laws of nature, what he in fact says about the laws of
nature seems to imply that they must be defined as exceptionless regulari
ties.41 We are told early in the argument that the laws of nature are based
on "infallible experience" and a little later that they have been established
by "firm and unalterable experience."42 Lest we misunderstand what is
meant by the phrase "firm and unalterable experience" Hume tells us that
"it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never
been observed in any age or country" and that "there must, therefore, be
a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event
would not merit that appellation."43 Further, when Hume is faced with
what would seem to be extremely strong evidence for the occurrence of an
event plausibly viewed as miraculous, he is prepared to assert either that
the event could not have occurred on the basis that miracles are absolutely
impossible, or, if the event occurred, it must not be a miracle.44 It thus
seems that, although Hume may have not noticed that he ruled out the
occurrence of miracles by definition, there is good reason to think that this
is in fact an implication of how he conceives the laws of nature.45
Strictly speaking, ruling out belief in miracles on the grounds that
there cannot exist exceptions to what are, by definition, exceptionless
regularities, does not commit one to a circular argument. Thus David
Johnson suggests that Hume might attempt to escape the charge of cir
cularity by making a conceptual argument from the very concept of a
law of nature against the logical possibility of a miracle. The problem,
as Johnson notes, is that, although there are elements of the "Essay" that
point Hume's argument in this direction, such a move does not fit well
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with Hume's claim of weighing the evidence for miracles against the evi
dence for the laws of nature. If the concept of miracle is a logical absur
d ity -a k in to the idea of a married bach elor-th ere is no need to raise the
issue of conflicting bodies of evidence, since there can exist no evidence
for what is logically impossible.
I think a good case can be made that there are conflicting lines of ar
gument in the "Essay." Although Hume's official stance seems to be that
miracles are logically possible but that there are insurmountable difficul
ties in justifying belief in their actual occurrence, the claims he makes at
several points in attempting to develop his argument imply the stronger
conclusion that miracles are logically impossible. It is this conflict between
his official stance and what he actually says in attempting to justify it that
enables authors such as Johnson to suggest that Hume's goals are so con
fused as to make it impossible to determine what his argument is.46 What
is clear is that, unless he is simply willing to suggest that the concept of a
miracle is logically incoherent, Hume's talk of "firm and unalterable expe
rience" as ruling out the possibility of belief in miracles leaves him open
to the charge of circularity.
Fogelin's criticism of Lewis hinges on his contention that Hume never
intended to argue that it is in principle impossible to justify belief in a
miracle on the basis of testimonial evidence. Although it has become in
creasingly popular, this claim appears fundamentally mistaken. There are
numerous lines of evidence, both direct and indirect, which demonstrate
it is untenable.47 In the context of the present discussion two examples will
suffice, although numerous others are available.
First, at the direct level, it cannot have escaped Hume's notice that to
claim "the proof against a miracle . . . is as entire as any argument from experi
ence can possibly be imagined" 48 (emphasis added) and that "such a proof
[cannot] be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite
proof, which is superior"49 does not allow the possibility of establishing a
miracle on the basis of testimonial evidence, since there is no way, even in
theory, that one could trump a proof against a miracle which "is as entire
as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." The most a
proponent of belief in miracle might hope for, even supposing she could
produce an entirely convincing proof of a miracle, is a mutual destruction
of arguments, i.e., a suspension of belief one way or another. Hume, of
course, is not unaware that this conclusion must follow, but with typi
cal irony and what Flew terms "mischievous modesty'50 he suggests that
belief could be justified if, per the impossible, the evidence for a miracle
could exceed the evidence against it.51
Second, at the indirect level, it is significant that all the responses made
to the "Essay" during Hume's lifetime took him to be arguing the impossi
bility of testimony justifying belief in miracles, but Hume never suggested
that these critics misunderstood the intent of the "Essay." Philip Skelton's
Opiomaches or Deism Revealed52 contains the first published reply to the
"Essay" and takes it as attempting to demonstrate that belief in miracles
can never be rational, yet Hume as the publisher's reader recommended
publication of Skelton's manuscript.53 Similarly, Campbell in his Disserta
tion on Miracles, takes Hume to be arguing for an in principle rejection of
establishing belief in miracles on the basis of testimony. Hume accepted an
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invitation to respond to Campbell, but at no point in criticizing Campbell
does he claim that Campbell has misunderstood what the argument of the
"Essay" is intended to establish. Hume's silence is inexplicable if he felt
that his respondents fundamentally missed the point of the "Essay," but
makes good sense if he intended to assert that no amount of testimonial
evidence could be sufficient to justify accepting a miracle report.54
That Hume does in fact intend his argument to be taken as an a priori
demonstration that belief in a miracle can never, even in principle, be jus
tified on the basis of testimony seems clear. Fogelin is wrong, therefore,
to suggest that Lewis's objection that Hume's argument is circular can
be simply dismissed on the basis that Lewis does not understand what
Hume is trying to show. There are conflicting elements of argument in
the "Essay," but at least some of these strongly suggest that the charge of
circularity is well grounded.55
We have looked at Lewis's explicit criticisms of Hume's argument,
which occur in Chapter XIII, "On Probability." I think, however, that a
more important criticism is implicit in Chapter VIII, "Miracle and the
Laws of Nature."
Hume's argument in Part I of the "Essay" can be summarized as follows:
The testimonial evidence in favour of a miracle inevitably conflicts
with the evidence in favour of the laws of nature.
The testimonial evidence in favour of a miracle cannot exceed, even
in principle, the evidence in favour of the laws of nature.
Therefore, belief in the occurrence of a miracle can never be justified
on the grounds of testimonial evidence.
Critics of the argument have almost exclusively focussed on the sec
ond premise. Accepting Hume's claim that a miracle must be conceived
as violating the laws of nature and thus that any evidence for a miracle
must conflict with the evidence for the laws of nature, they have left the
first premise unexamined. This is unfortunate, since accepting the first
premise means that even if, contra Hume, there exists in some cases suf
ficient evidence to justify belief in a miracle, this evidence must be viewed
as necessarily conflicting with another body of evidence we are strongly
inclined to accept, namely the evidence which justifies belief in the laws of
nature. Thus Hume insists that
the very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree
of assurance in the testimony of witnesses gives us also, in this case
[reports of miracles], another degree of assurance against the fact
which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there
necessarily arises a counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief
and authority.56
The view that a necessary condition of an event being a miracle is that
it violates the laws of nature, arises out of the assumption that divine
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interventions in nature would necessarily involve violating the laws of na
ture. One of Lewis's greatest insights is that this assumption is mistaken.
That it is mistaken can be seen if one reflects on the fact that laws of nature
do not, by themselves, allow the prediction or explanation of any event.
Scientific explanations must make reference not only to laws of nature, but
to material conditions to which the laws apply. Thus, although we often
speak as though the laws of nature are, in themselves, sufficient to explain
the occurrence of an event, this is not really so. Any explanation involving
the laws of nature must make reference not only to those laws, but also to
the actual "stuff" of nature whose behaviour is described by the laws of
nature. As Lewis notes,
we are in the habit of talking as if they [the laws of nature] caused
events to happen; but they have never caused any event at all. The
laws of motion do not set billiard balls moving: they analyse the mo
tion after something else (say, a man with a cue, or a lurch of the liner,
or, perhaps, supernatural power) has provided it. They produce no
events: they state the pattern to which every event—if only it can be
induced to happen—must conform, just as the rules of arithmetic state
the pattern to which all transactions with money must conform—if
only you can get hold of any money. Thus in one sense the laws of
Nature cover the whole field of space and time; in another, what they
leave out is precisely the whole real universe—the incessant torrent
of actual events which makes up true history. That must come from
somewhere else. To think the laws can produce it is like thinking that
you can create real money by simply doing sums. For every law, in
the last resort, says "If you have A, then you will get B." But first catch
your A: the laws won't do it for you.57
If we keep in mind this basic distinction between the laws of nature and
the "stuff," call it mass/energy, whose behaviour they describe, it can be
seen that, although a miracle is an event which would never have oc
curred without the overriding of nature, this in no way entails the claim
that a miracle involves a violation of the laws of nature. If a transcen
dent agent creates or annihilates a unit of mass/energy, or if he simply
causes some of the stuff to occupy a different position than it did formerly,
then he changes the material conditions to which the laws of nature ap
ply. He thereby produces an event that nature on its own would not have
produced, but He breaks no laws of nature. To use Lewis's example, one
would not violate or suspend the laws of motion if one were to toss an
extra billiard ball into a group of billiard balls in motion on a billiard table,
yet one would override the outcome of what would otherwise be expected
to happen on the table. Similarly,
if God creates a miraculous spermatozoon in the body of a virgin, it
does not proceed to break any laws. The laws at once take it over. . . .
Pregnancy follows, according to all the normal laws, and nine months
later a child is born. . . . If events ever come from beyond Nature alto
gether she will . . . [not be] incommoded by them__ The moment they
enter her realm they obey all her laws. Miraculous wine will intoxicate,
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miraculous conception will lead to pregnancy, inspired books will suf
fer all the ordinary processes of textual corruption, miraculous bread
will be digested. The divine art of miracle is not an art of suspending
the pattern to which events conform but of feeding new events into
that pattern. It does not violate the law's proviso, "If A, then B": it says,
"But this time instead of A, A2'" and Nature, speaking through all her
laws, replies, "Then B2'" and naturalises the immigrant, as she well
knows how.58
The importance of Lewis's insight is that if miracles can occur without
violating the laws of nature then the testimonial evidence in favour of
miracles need not be conceived as conflicting with the evidence which
grounds belief in the laws of nature. This means that Hume's argument in
Part I of the "Essay," depending as it does upon the assumption that these
two bodies of evidence must conflict, cannot even get started.
An important objection which might be raised, but which Lewis fails to
discuss is that at least one law of nature must be broken on this account
of miracle, since the creation, annihilation or moving of material entities
by a non-physical agent would involve the creation or destruction of en
ergy and thus would violate the First Law of Thermodynamics, i.e., the
Principle of the Conservation of Energy. It seems, however, that Lewis's
account can be defended against this objection.
This objection fails to take into consideration a very important distinc
tion between two forms of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.
The Principle is commonly stated as "Energy can neither be created nor
destroyed" or as "In an isolated system the total amount of energy remains
constant'; the assumption being that these two statements are logically
equivalent. This, though, is false. We can deduce from the proposition
"Energy can neither be created nor destroyed" the proposition "In an iso
lated system the total amount of energy remains constant," but we cannot
deduce from the proposition "In an isolated system the total amount of
energy remains constant" deduce the proposition "Energy can neither be
created nor destroyed." The proposition "Energy can neither be created
nor destroyed" is considerably stronger, i.e., carries a greater ontological
commitment, than the proposition "In an isolated system the total amount
of energy remains constant.'
The significance of this distinction is considerable. First, it bears em
phasis that the strong form of the Principle, i.e., the claim that energy can
neither be created nor destroyed, not only rules out miracles but theism
in general, since it rules out the possibility of creation ex nihilo. Second,
although the believer in miracles must reject the strong form of the Prin
ciple, she can accept what I have called the weak form of the Principle, i.e.,
the claim that energy is conserved in a causally isolated system. She is in a
position to accept all the experimental evidence taken to support belief in
the Principle, since that evidence only demonstrates there is good reason
to believe that energy is conserved in a causally isolated system. She rejects
not the well-evidenced claim that in a causally isolated system energy is
conserved, but the much more questionable claim that nature is an isolated
system, in the sense that it is not open to the causal influence of God. In
short, she is in a position to affirm the Principle of the Conservation of

166

Faith and Philosophy

Energy when it is formulated as a scientific law and not as an a priori meta
physical principle which excludes the possibility of theism being true.
It is clear, therefore, that conceiving of a miracle as involving the cre
ation or annihilation of mass/energy does not imply that the Principle of
the Conservation of Energy is violated, so long as there is good reason to
adopt the weak rather than the strong form of the Principle. Accepting the
occurrence of a miracle involving the creation or annihilation of energy
does not commit one to denying the vast body of experimental evidence
supporting belief that energy is conserved in an isolated system. Rather,
accepting the occurrence of such a miracle commits one to arguing that
the inference employed in moving from the claim that energy is conserved
in an isolated system to the claim that energy can neither be created nor
destroyed is ill-founded.59
That the inference is ill-founded and tends to be question-begging seems
clear. The experimental evidence taken to support belief in the Principle
establishes that we have good reason to believe that energy is conserved
in an isolated system, but is neutral as regards the further question of
whether or not there exists something capable of creating or destroying
energy. All that any experiment or series of experiments can show is that
energy was conserved in an isolated system on a particular occasion or
series of occasions. If the move from the weak form of the Principle is to
be justified, it must be on the basis that the strong form of the Principle
provides an explanation of why the weak form holds true and that there
exists no evidence that energy is ever created or destroyed. This move is
problematic on several counts.
First, the theist is able to provide an alternative explanation of why the
weak form of the Principle would hold true. Conceiving of the universe
as a contingent reality in which physical causes operate, equally explains
why the weak form holds true. Insisting that energy can neither be created
nor destroyed seems merely to attribute necessary existence to energy
rather than to God and makes clear the fact that the strong form functions
not simply as a statement of observed regularity in nature, but as a defin
ing-postulate of physicalism.
Second, the strong form seems at odds with the Big-Bang theory of
the origin of the universe. This theory is commonly accepted and com
monly interpreted as implying an absolute beginning to the energy that
composes the universe. It is possible to accept both the weak form of the
Principle and the Big-Bang theory, but it is hard to see how acceptance of
the Big-Bang theory is consistent with affirming the truth of the strong
form of the Principle.
Third, leaving aside the fact that commonly accepted scientific theory
may imply the falsity of the strong form of the Principle, it is clear that the
physicalist is in no position to object to belief in miracles on the basis of
the strong form of the Principle. The occurrence of miracles would imply
the creation or annihilation of energy, but would not imply that energy is
not conserved in an isolated system. The theist denies not that energy is
conserved in an isolated system, but rather that the physical universe is
an isolated system in the sense that it is never causally affected by tran
scendent agents. Given a positive body of evidence for miracles, it will
not do to try and frame a Humean type balance-of-probabilities argument
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designed to show there is a conflict between the experimental evidence
taken to support belief in the Principle of the Conservation of Energy and
the evidence in favour of miracles. The occurrence of miracles conceived
as acts of creation or annihilation of energy conflicts not with any positive
evidence supporting belief in the Principle, but rather with a metaphysi
cal commitment to naturalism. Faced with reports of events which would
constitute positive evidence that energy can be created or destroyed, it
begs the question to dismiss such events, or to argue that they are an
tecedently improbable, on the ground that they imply the falsity of the
strong form of the Principle.60 It seems, therefore, that Lewis is correct in
his assertion that miracles should not be defined as implying violation of
the laws of nature.
I conclude that Lewis's views on miracle are worthy of more attention
and respect by professional philosophers than they typically receive. Es
pecially important is his insight that miracles need not be defined as viola
tions of the laws of nature and the implications this insight has for Hume's
famous argument in Part I of the "Essay on Miracles."61
University of New Brunswick (Fredericton)
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